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Kurzfassung
Zur Unterstu¨tzung des Kernwaffenteststopp-Vertrages (CTBT) befindet sich ein
internationales Kontrollsystem (IMS) im Aufbau, das der Erfassung und Lokali-
sierung geheimer nuklearer Explosionen dienen wird, sobald der Vertrag in Kraft
tritt. Neben Seismik, Hydroakustik und Infraschall wird eine U¨berwachung von
radioaktiven Partikeln und Edelgasen Anwendung finden.
Edelgase sind von besonderer Bedeutung fu¨r die Identifizierung unterirdis-
cher nuklearer Explosionen, da es a¨ußerst schwierig fu¨r einen Vertragsverletzer
wa¨re, diese daran zu hindern in die Atmospha¨re einzudringen. Die Radioxenon-
isotope 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe und 135Xe werden bei Kernspaltung in genu¨gen-
den Mengen erzeugt und erfu¨llen erwiesenermaßen die Anforderungen des IMS.
Deshalb wurden sie als CTBT-relevant eingestuft und fu¨r eine kontinuierliche
U¨berwachung ausgewa¨hlt. In letzter Zeit wurden Studien u¨ber die Radioxenon-
abgabe aus Kernkraftwerken und Produktionsanlagen von Radiopharmazeutika
vero¨ffentlicht, die Radioxenonabgabe von Versuchsreaktoren wurde jedoch noch
nicht untersucht.
Diese Arbeit pra¨sentiert eine erste Quantifizierung des Ausstoßes der vier
CTBT-relevanten Radioxenonisotope eines TRIGA Versuchsreaktors. Zu diesem
Zweck wurde ein mobiler Sampler des Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble gas
Acquisition (SAUNA) an das Atominstitut Wien gebracht und auf der Reak-
torplattform des TRIGA Mark II Reaktors aufgebaut. Luftproben wurden u¨ber
dem Reaktorbecken und aus den mit Luft gefu¨llten Bestrahlungsrohren genom-
men und an das Labor des Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) geschickt,
wo sie mittels Beta-Gamma-Koinzidenz ausgewertet wurden. Außerdem wurde
die Radioxenonabgabe von hoch angereichertem Uran (93% HEU) wa¨hrend der
Bestrahlung in einem Bestrahlungsrohr untersucht.
Die vier CTBT-relevanten Xenonisotope 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe und 135Xe kon-
nten mit Aktivita¨tskonzentrationen von 0.01 bis 1.6× 104 Bq/m3 nachgewiesen
werden. Daru¨ber hinaus wurde 125Xe, das durch Neutroneneinfang von 124Xe
entsteht, in mehreren Proben gefunden. Sein Anteil gegenu¨ber den oben erwa¨hn-
ten Radioxenonisotopen konnte durch numerische Berechnungen besta¨tigt wer-
den.
Abstract
In support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) an Inter-
national Monitoring System (IMS) is being established that will be used to
detect and locate clandestine nuclear explosions once the treaty has come into
force. Besides seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound techniques the verification
regime will employ monitoring of radioactive particulates and noble gases.
Noble gases are of especial importance to identify underground nuclear explo-
sions, since they are most difficult to prevent from migrating into the atmosphere
for a treaty violator. The radioxenon isotopes 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe and 135Xe
are sufficiently produced in fission and were proven to fulfill the demands of the
IMS. Therefore, they have been classified as CTBT-relevant and selected for con-
tinuous monitoring. Recently, studies have been published regarding releases of
radioxenons from radiopharmaceutical facilities and nuclear power plants. The
radioxenon releases from research reactors, however, have not been studied yet.
This work presents a first quantification of releases of the four CTBT-relevant
radioxenon isotopes from a TRIGA research reactor. For this purpose a portable
field sampler of the Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble gas Acquisition (SAUNA)
was shipped to the Atominstitut of Vienna and assembled on the reactor plat-
form of the TRIGA Mark II reactor. Air samples were taken above the reactor
pool and from irradiation tubes containing air and shipped to the lab of the
Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) for analysis using beta-gamma coinci-
dence techniques. Furthermore, radioxenon releases of irradiated highly enriched
uranium (93% HEU) were studied separately.
The four CTBT-relevant xenon isotopes 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe and 135Xe have
been detected with activity concentrations between 0.01 to 1.6 × 104 Bq/m3.
Furthermore 125Xe, formed by neutron capture of 124Xe in air, was determined
to be present in several samples. Its ratio compared to the above mentioned
radioxenon isotopes was conform to numerical predictions.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Nuclear fission and fission products
Nuclear fission is probably one of the most far-reaching discoveries in natural
science. Otto Hahn and Fritz Straßmann observed the first induced nuclear
fission of uranium in 1938. But it was Lise Meitner together with her nephew
Otto Frisch who first suggested nuclear fission as the reason for the detection
of 141Ba, a typical fission product that does not occur in nature [Meitner and
Frisch, 1939].
Ever since, an enormous spectrum of technologies has been developed to take
advantage out of this process. The energy set free during fission of heavy ele-
ments like e.g. 235U is being used in power plants but also in nuclear weapons.
Besides lighter nuclei and energy, fission often produces free neutrons. Although
neutrons possess an electric dipole moment, they are uncharged particles. Thus
they can easily overcome the electronic shell of an atom and attach to the nu-
cleus. This way, they can induce new fission reactions. In a nuclear reactor
this chain reaction is controlled, whereas in a nuclear explosion it is intended to
create an uncontrolled chain reaction within the explosive material. In nuclear
weapon design much effort is spent to keep this chain reaction going as long as
possible, so that preferably much fissile material is used.
Every fission leaves fission products behind, lighter nuclei often times rich
in neutrons and radioactive. The amount, in which the fission products are
statistically produced, is referred to as fission yield and is normally stated as
percentage per fission. It is energetically favorable for the nucleus to split into
two parts of different sizes. The yield function drawn against the mass number is
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asymmetric and bimodal. Its exact form depends on the neutron energy, as can
be seen in figure 1.1. The maxima of the curve lies between the mass numbers
90 and 105 respectively 130 and 140 (amu). Radioxenon isotopes, like 133Xe,
are produced in fairly large quantity during fission.
Figure 1.1: Nuclear fission yield for 235U for fission induced by thermal neutrons
(0.025 eV; black line) and high energy neutrons (14.7 MeV; red line)
[England and Rider, 1994]
Many fission products do not occur in nature, so a detection of such isotopes
represents a firm sign that nuclear fission took place. The isotopic signatures
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set free by any nuclear source depend on the distribution of isotopes produced
by fission and the activation build-up.
1.2 Nuclear weapons
1.2.1 General
A nuclear weapon is a device that uses nuclear fission or nuclear fusion for
its destructive power. Compared to conventional explosives, the quantity of
energy released from a nuclear weapon is by far higher. Even with a small
yield nuclear explosives can annihilate a whole city within a second and are
therefore considered to be weapons of mass destruction. In history only two
nuclear weapons have been used offensively, both at the end of World War II.
The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are estimated to have killed
as many as 64,000 people in Hiroshima and 39,000 in Nagasaki within four
months after the attacks [Oughterson and Shields, 1956]. Long term effects
of ionizing radiation caused even more deaths and illnesses due to damages of
genetic material. The vast power of nuclear bombs can be seen in Figure 1.2.
Since their infamous debut, the use, development and the control of nuclear
weapons has always been a major issue in international policy.
At the present time the only countries acknowledging to possess such weapons
are the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pak-
istan, and North Korea. It is widely believed that Israel possesses nuclear
weapons, although it never acknowledged having them.
1.2.2 Types
There are basically two types of nuclear weapons mentioned in open source
information:
1. Devices that solely use nuclear fission for their destructive power.
2. Devices that use nuclear fusion to increase the total energy release.
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Figure 1.2: The city of Hiroshima after the nuclear explosion of the “Little Boy”
device (13-18 kT). (Public domain)
The first type uses only nuclear fission. In such weapons conventional chemical
explosives are used to rapidly bring fissile material into a supercritical mass.
An assembly is called supercritical when the percentage of fission-produced neu-
trons captured by another fissile nucleus is large enough, so that each fission
event induces more than one following fission events. Consequently, an uncon-
trolled nuclear chain reaction is started growing exponentially and releasing a
great amount of energy within microseconds. The simplest method to accom-
plish this is used in the gun-type assembly by shooting one piece of subcritical
mass into another. Typically, a projectile is shot onto a hollow set of rings
both made of fissile material. However, once the two parts are close enough,
the assembly becomes critical, meaning that every neutron set free by sponta-
neous fission may induce a nuclear chain reaction. If this happens too early
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it causes the bomb to fizzle, blowing most of the still unused fuel apart (so
called pre-detonation). Since weapons-grade plutonium (239Pu with less than
7% 240Pu) is always contaminated with 240Pu, which increases the neutron rate
from spontaneous fission, a gun-type bomb is thought to only be practical with
enriched uranium. This method was applied in the “Little Boy” bomb, that
detonated over Hiroshima with an estimated yield of 13−18 kt TNT equivalent,
which corresponds to somewhat more than 1 percent efficiency [Glasstone, 1977]
[Bernstein, 2008].
Figure 1.3: A schematic view of a gun-type fission bomb
A more sophisticated approach is the implosion assembly method, which de-
rives the detonation energy from compressing a subcritical mass into a super-
critical. It is possible to use weapon grade uranium as well as weapons-grade
plutonium for this type, although plutonium is the standard material since the
early 1960s. A quite inefficient design is the linear implosion type, where two
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conventional explosives facing each other compress the ovoid formed plutonium
fuel into a sphere. Explosives arranged in a spherical symmetrical way around
the plutonium are most effective. It is aimed to keep the supercritical mass
together as long as possible to ensure many fission reactions to happen. For
this reason a tamper, especially dense and heavy material surrounding the plu-
tonium, most commonly 238U, is used to pick up the impulse of the implosion
and due to its inertia enabling a longer reaction time. It is a major challenge to
create a homogeneous shock wave towards the center, so a subtle arrangement
as well as precise timing of the explosives is crucial for its “successful” out-
come. Like the first man-made nuclear explosion (“Trinity”; see next chapter)
the “Fat Man” bomb that destroyed Nagasaki was an implosion type bomb. It
had a yield of about 21 kt and an estimated 17 percent efficiency [Glasstone,
1977], [Bernstein, 2008].
The second type of nuclear weapon uses nuclear fusion either to improve the
implosion design or to produce a large amount of its energy out of fusion. In so
called fusion boosted fission bombs the energy provided by fusion is negligible.
The high pressure of the implosion is used to start fusion reactions in a mixture
of tritium and deuterium. The hydrogen isotopes fuse to helium also producing
free neutrons, which are used to boost fission reactions in the plutonium pit.
The amount of fissile material can be significantly reduced by this method,
which reduces the size of the device while keeping the same destructive energy.
While pure fission or fusion-boosted fission weapons can be made to yield
hundreds of kilotons equivalent to TNT, the most efficient way to build a nuclear
weapon is realized in multi-stage thermonuclear weapons. The basic idea is to
connect different parts of a weapon in “stages”, with the detonation of the first
stage providing the energy to induce the second stage and so on. This principle
is realized in the Teller-Ulam design, named after two of its main developers,
Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam. They were the first to come up with the
implosion by radiation principle, which was kept secret for nearly three decades
and is colloquially referred to as the “H-bomb secret”. High levels of X-ray
radiation are set free by the first stage, usually an implosion design fission bomb,
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are reflected by the weapon’s outer casing and used to compress the pusher of
the secondary stage, which contains the fusion fuel. The energy of the radiation
is captured by a highly absorbing material, such as styrofoam, creating a strong
radial inward momentum. The pusher is usually made out of 238U and has the
function of holding the fusion fuel together inertially. Additionally, because of
its ability to undergo fission induced by high energy neutrons set free by the
fusion reactions, the pusher also serves as a chief energy source.
The first two-stage thermonuclear bomb “Ivy Mike” detonated on 1 Novem-
ber 1952 on the Enewetak atoll in the Pacific and had a yield of around 12
Mt equivalent to TNT. The fusion fuel consisted out of a mixture of cryogeni-
cally cooled liquid tritium and deuterium, which was extremley sumptuous (the
cooling system alone weighed around 18t). Since lithium was found to be a
practical tritium producer (7Li(n, nα)3H and 6Li(n, α)3H) a mixture of lithium
and deuterium was normally used as fusion fuel.
The secondary stage is usually shown as a column of fusion fuel surrounded by
the pusher and including a “spark”, a subcritical assembly of fissile material like
239Pu. Once the fusion fuel together with the spark is compressed and heated
by the pusher, the spark becomes supercritical and fission reactions begin to
release neutrons. The neutrons interact with lithium in the fusion fuel creating
tritium. Because of the high temperature and pressure, fusion reactions are
induced creating even more neutrons. In this high neutron flux the 238U of
the pusher undergoes fission [Rhodes, 1995]. The Castle Bravo test, that was
conducted by the United States in 1954, had, for example, a total yield of 15
Mt whereof around 10 Mt were derived of the 238U pusher.
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Figure 1.4: A possible realization of the Teller-Ulam design: The first stage is
shown as a fusion-boosted implosion type bomb. The function of the
reflective casing is to trap the radiation of the first stage inside and
to direct it onto the secondary stage.
The tertiary stage, if one is present, would be placed below the secondary
being very similar in design and made up of the same material as the secondary.
1.2.3 Nuclear weapons testing
The first detonation of a nuclear bomb was conducted on 16 June 1945 by the
United States in the desert of New Mexico. “Trinity’s” purpose was to verify
the implosion-type design as practicable since the scientists of the Manhattan
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Project were very sure about the functioning of gun-type bombs like the “Little
Boy”. With a total yield of between 20 kt and 22 kt, “Trinity” exceeded the
developers predictions and the implosion-type design was then first deployed in
the “Fat Man” bomb [Hoddeson et al., 1993].
After World War ll the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb “Joe 1” on
29 August 1949 marking the beginning of the nuclear arms race. Other countries
followed: The United Kingdom carried out its first nuclear weapons test in 1952
followed by France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, Pakistan in 1998 and
North Korea in 2006.
Figure 1.5: The fireball of the “Trinity” test, 0.016 seconds after detonation,
with a diameter of about 200m. In the foreground, trees are pictured
as small black dots. Picture taken from [LANL, 2009].
On 1 November 1952 the first fusion bomb “Ivy Mike” was tested by the
United States. Two years later the “Castle Bravo” test at the Bikini Atoll
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created massive international concern when its fallout poisoned inhabitants of
the atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utirik as well as the crew of the Japanese
fishing trawler “Lucky Dragon”. One member of the trawler crew died from
radiation sickness and many of the islands inhabitants suffered from radiation
burns and later from radiation related diseases as well as an increased rate of
cancer and birth defects. This was probably the worst U.S. nuclear incident
and it globally called attention to the hazards of nuclear testing. Nevertheless
thermonuclear weapons were tested by many other countries such as the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.
In 1961 the Soviet Union tested the “Tsar”, the largest and most powerful
nuclear weapon ever detonated. It had a total yield of about 50 Mt and con-
sisted out of three stages. To reduce the radioactive fallout, which would have
probably hit Soviet territory, it was decided to replace the 238U pusher by lead.
Otherwise the yield was estimated to be around 100 Mt. As a matter of fact,
the Tsar was one of the “cleanest” bombs, since approximately 97% of the total
yield was provided by fusion reactions [Khariton and Smirnov, 1993]. The most
recent nuclear tests in history were performed by North Korea in 2006 and 2009.
Altogether over 2000 nuclear tests were carried out all over the world since 1945.
Nuclear weapons tests are divided into categories according to the environ-
ment of the test [Glasstone, 1977]:
• Atmospheric testing refers to explosions in or above the atmosphere. Typ-
ically, these are realized by mounting a nuclear bomb on top of a tower,
planting it on the ground, elevating it with a balloon or dropping it from
an airplane. Close to the ground nuclear explosions generate a distinc-
tive mushroom cloud of dirt and debris. Although any kind of explosion,
powerful enough, can form such a mushroom cloud, it is inseparably asso-
ciated with nuclear weapons. Atmospheric tests produce large amounts of
radioactive fallout compared to underground or underwater tests.
• Underground testing is performed under the surface of the earth. This
type of testing was applied in the majority of all nuclear tests that were
carried out since 1963. Depending on the depth and the bomb yield, the
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soil can provide a shielding from the atmosphere. The enormous heat
of the explosion often leaves behind a sphere of glazed rocks and stones
almost fully containing radioactive fallout. However, when the roof of the
cavity collapses subsidence craters are formed and radioactive debris can
be set free into the atmosphere. Usually an underground test results in
seismic activity proportional to the yield of the nuclear device but also
depending on the materials of the surrounding soil.
• Underwater testing covers test detonations carried out under water or close
to the surface of water. In history there were comparatively few tests of
this nature. Their typical purpose was to evaluate the effects of nuclear
weapons against naval vessels. The depth beneath the water surface has a
major influence on the effects of the explosion. Shallow underwater explo-
sions are able to lift huge masses of water to heights of several thousands
of meters in a column-like form. Deep underwater explosions, on the other
hand, usually direct a large amount of the energy into forming surface
waves and are therefore particularly able to devastate coastal areas. Both
types create underwater shockwaves that can be recorded hydroacousti-
cally. In addition to fission products, radioactive water and steam are
dispersed into the atmosphere.
Beyond that, nuclear tests are often categorized by the purpose of the test itself.
Weapon-related tests are conducted to investigate the functioning and behavior
of the weapon design, whereas weapon-effect tests are to analyze the effects
on organisms and structures. Nuclear testing has also been used for clearly
political purposes. The Tsar bomb, that was mentioned earlier, is a perfect
example for this since it was too large and heavy to be practically used against
an enemy target. The Tu-95V plane needed to be modified in order to carry the
26 t of weight. Additionally, efforts have been made to use nuclear explosions
peacefully for economic reasons. There were a variety of objectives from deep
seismic sounding, creating underground storage cavities or reservoirs and helping
to construct a canal. The United States and the Soviet Union both had Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions (PNE) programs and conducted several nuclear tests to gain
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information about its feasibility. However, no PNE project could justify the
risks and the expenses involved and so the idea was eventually dropped.
1.3 The CTBT
During the cold war the United States of America and the Soviet Union and their
respective allies competed for supremacy in nuclear warfare. A great number of
nuclear bomb tests have been conducted on both sides at this time. Together
with the aim to slow down the arms race, concerns about radioactive fallout
led to the mutual wish for a regulating treaty. On 5 August 1963 the Partial
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), prohibiting all test detonations of nuclear
weapons on ground surface, in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space,
was opened for signature. Underground tests, however, were not banned by
this treaty. The PTBT was signed by the USA, the Soviet Union and many
other countries excluding, however, for example France and China. Five years
later, on 1 July 1968, the first treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, the
Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was agreed upon. Its main objectives
are often referred to as the three pillars: 1. non-proliferation 2. disarmament 3.
the right to use nuclear technology peacefully. The International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) is in charge of controlling the compliance with the treaty as its
inspectorate. Each member state agrees to accept safeguards of the IAEA to
verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy technology from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. At the moment only
four countries with nuclear capabilities are not parties to or withdrew from the
treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. With the end of the cold war
the interest for a new more restrictive test ban treaty arose. On 24 September
1996 the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), banning all kind of
nuclear test explosions, was opened for signature. The total ban of any type of
nuclear weapon testing is to be seen as a major step in the process of nuclear
disarmament [UNGA, 1996]. Furthermore without the opportunity to test new
developments it constricts the qualitative improvement and the upcoming of
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more advanced types of nuclear weapons.
Article 1 of this treaty expresses its main essence:
1. Each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to
prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place
under its jurisdiction.
2. Each state party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from
causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying
out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion.
The CTBT will enter into force 180 days after all 44 so-called ”Annex 2
states”, which are the states that participated in the negotiations and had nu-
clear power plants or research reactors at that time, have signed and ratified the
treaty. Until then the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for the CTBT
Organization (CTBTO) is in charge of establishing a global alarm system and
promoting the signing and ratification procedures. The PTS consists of three
technical divisions: the International Monitoring System (IMS) division, the
International Data Center (IDC) division and the On-Site Inspection (OSI) di-
vision [Hoffmann et al., 1999]. The IMS division has the task to create a reliable
verification system, which is being built up at the moment. The IMS will consist
of 170 seismic, 11 hydroacoustic, 60 infrasound and 80 radionuclide stations (80
particulate stations of which 40 will also have capabilities for noble gas measure-
ments)[Dahlman et al., 2009]. In addition, there will be 16 certified radionuclide
laboratories available for remeasureing samples in order to check the results from
radionuclide particulate stations. All collected monitoring data is transmitted
to the IDC, where it is processed, manually reviewed and analyzed. The results
are presented to all member states as bulletins and reports [Matthews and De
Geer, 2005]. On-site inspections represent the final verification measure: Every
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member state has the right to call for an on-site inspection and present a re-
quest to the Executive Council, the executive organ of the CTBTO. It consists
of 51 elected members from six different regions of the earth. For a decision to
proceed, at least 30 members are required to vote in favor of an on-site inspec-
tion. During such an inspection, facts are gathered to leave no doubt whether
a nuclear explosion took place or not. It is to be carried out by inspectors from
member states supported by the Technical Secretariat [Dahlman et al., 2009].
While seismic, infrasound and hydro-acoustic monitoring can determine if an
explosion took place, only radionuclide monitoring can verify the source as a nu-
clear explosion [De Geer, 1996]. Non-gaseous fission products are able to form
particulates and mix with air as aerosol particles, which can be trapped by fil-
ters. In the past, several nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere were detected
trough particulate monitoring. However, it is rather unlikely for aerosols pro-
duced in an underground nuclear test to leave the soil in a detectable amount.
Noble gases are chemically inert and are, therefore, most likely to be observed,
even from an underground source. They can migrate to the surface along geo-
logical faults and cracks, especially when drawn by low barometric pressure.
In 1999 the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) was launched with
the aim to develop noble gas systems suitable for IMS purposes [Auer et al.,
2004]. The main criterion is that the Minimum Detectable Concentration (MDC)
of 133Xe has to be 1 mBq/m3 or lower for a 24 h period of sampling [Schulze
et al., 2000]. The USA, Russia, France and Sweden each contributed by building
different systems: ARSA, ARIX, SPALAX and SAUNA respectively. With ex-
ception of the SPALAX system, which uses high resolution gamma spectroscopy,
all systems now use beta-gamma coincidence techniques. They were all tested
in Freiburg in 2001 and were proven to fulfill the demands of the IMS network
[Auer et al., 2004]. At the moment three systems are being deployed at monitor-
ing stations around the world. In addition to that, mobile versions of the ARIX
and the SAUNA systems that are able to perform on-site inspections have been
developed.
18
1.4 Sources of radioxenon
1.4.1 General
Despite their rather short half-lives (see Table 1.1) radioxenon isotopes can be
found in almost every region of the earth. The reason for the global radioxenon
background is a continuous production in different nuclear facilities. Nearly
all radioxenon in the atmosphere is of anthropogenic origin and its regional
background concentration can vary from station to station depending how many
and which radioxenon sources are close [Saey and De Geer, 2005].
Isotope Half-life
131mXe 11.84 d
133mXe 2.19 d
133Xe 5.24 d
135Xe 9.10 h
Table 1.1: Radioxenon isotopes of interest and their half-lives
To facilitate the verification of compliance with the CTBT it is important to
distinguish civil sources from nuclear explosions. The factors that are responsible
for the difference in isotopic activity ratios relate on the small time window of
about one microsecond in which most fissions during a nuclear explosion take
place. Most fissions, therefore, are induced by fast unmoderated neutrons, which
results in different fission yields (see figure 1.1). Additionally there is little time
for activation products to build up. Contrary to that, in a nuclear reactor
most fissions are induced by moderated neutrons and there is a lot of time for
activation products to build up. These two effects lead to different isotopic
signatures.
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1.4.2 Civil sources
There are a number of possible civil sources of fission products including the four
CTBT relevant xenon isotopes: nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors,
fuel reprocessing plants and radiopharmaceutical sources [Saey, 2007].
In October 2009, 436 nuclear power reactors providing over 370 GW of total
power output were in operation worldwide [PRIS, 2009]. In nuclear power plants
fissile material together with a moderator create a controlled nuclear chain re-
action. Control rods containing neutron absorbing material are used to keep
the rate of fissions at a safe level. The average total energy produced in one
fission of 235U is 200 MeV. Most of the energy is carried by the fission products
producing heat, which is converted into electrical power by a steam turbine.
The fuel rods consist of the fuel itself and a cladding. Usually uranium oxide
or uranium oxide mixed with plutonium oxide pressed to small pellets is used
as fuel. Since zirconium has a very low neutron caption cross section, alloys
with a high percentage of zirconium like Zircalloy (∼ 90% zirconium) are the
most common materials for the cladding. The purpose of the cladding is to
seal the fuel from the coolant preventing fission products to leak out. However,
corrosion, the exposure to high radiation and thermal stress, especially during
start-up and shut-down, are well known problems that can cause cracks in the
cladding. Also, traces of fissile material in the coolant itself or contamination on
the surface of the cladding can set free radioxenon isotopes once they undergo
fission. Additionally, fission products can leave the fuel rods during a reactor
incident. The quantities released from a nuclear power plant depend very much
on the containment of the facility and the circumstances, under which the release
happens.
After a period of time a fuel rod comes to a point where it is no longer useful
in sustaining a nuclear chain reaction and needs to be replaced with new ones.
Nuclear reprocessing is often applied to fuel rods after they have cooled down
for many months or some years in order to extract remaining fissile material
and facilitate further waste management. For this purpose the cladding, still
containing most of the fission products, is detached and the fuel is dissolved in
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acid or a basic solution. The standard method for reprocessing nuclear fuel is
PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction). At the moment
this is the most developed technique. For the extraction of plutonium and
uranium a mixture of tributylphosphate and kerosene is used [Makhijani et al.,
1995]. Most of the fission products set free during this process are removed by
waste processing techniques, noble gases, however, are quite likely to escape.
Most radioxenons will have decayed until then, although some might still be
present from the spontaneous fission of 240Pu. So it is mainly 85Kr, a typical
fission product as well, with a half-life of 10.8 a which is being released by fuel
reprocessing plants [Winger et al., 2005].
In nuclear medicine radioactive isotopes are used for the diagnosis and treat-
ment of diseases. The application of radiopharmaceuticals in molecular imaging
has, in contrast to other imaging techniques (e.g. X-ray), the feature to depict
metabolic processes. In therapeutic use, radiation sources external to the body
(radiotherapy) and implanted radiation sources (brachytherapy) are often em-
ployed to treat diseases such as cancer or as palliative care. Most commonly
used radioisotopes are 99mTc, 133Xe and 201Tl for imaging and 90Y as well as
131I for therapeutical purposes. The radioactive isotopes are produced within
large hospitals and medical centers or in commercial radiopharmaceutical plants.
There are basically two ways to produce a certain radioisotope of interest: by
fission or via neutron activation, whereas the fission method is much more effi-
cient. Both can be accomplished within a nuclear reactor. After a certain time
of neutron irradiation the fission products and the neutron activation products
are extracted chemically. The radioxenons built up from fission can escape into
the atmosphere especially during chemical separation [Saey, 2009].
1.4.3 Releases from nuclear tests
A nuclear explosion takes place in a very short period of time. Within a microsec-
ond the energy release from fissions becomes large enough to burst the critical
assembly and end the chain reaction. Contrary to fission in a nuclear reactor,
fission during a nuclear explosion is predominantly induced by fast unmoderated
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neutrons, which results in slightly different yields. Additionally, because of the
brief time span, neutron activation occurs to a minor extent.
A nuclear detonation with the power of one kiloton equivalent to TNT releases
an amount of energy equal to 4.2× 1012 J. In average, the total energy set free
by the fission of one 235U atom is 200 MeV (3.2× 10−11 J) which splits up into
following fragments:
• 165 MeV kinetic energy of fission products
• 7 MeV prompt γ radiation
• 6 MeV kinetic energy of neutrons
• 7 MeV excitation energy of fission products
• 6 MeV γ radiation from fission products
• 9 MeV antineutrinos from β− decaying fission products
For one fission approximately 180 MeV are immediately available as energy,
which makes about 1.45×1023 fissions per kiloton. According to the cumulative
fission yield of the nuclear fuel inside the device the released activity can be
calculated for each isotope. Looking at the three typical materials used in nuclear
bombs (235U,238U and 239Pu), the cumulative fission yields of 133Xe lie between
4.86% for 239Pu and 6.02% for 238U, both induced by high energy neutrons (14.7
MeV) [England and Rider, 1994]. Thus, the number of 133Xe nuclei created lies
between 7.0× 1021 and 8.7× 1021. The activity can be calculated with:
A = λ ·N(t) = ln(2)
t1/2
·N(t)
and equals 1.07×1016 Bq respectively 1.33×1016 Bq [Saey, 2007]. Therefore, the
initial release of a nuclear explosion with the power of 1 kiloton lies somewhere
between these two values, according to the fuel composition. However, regarding
the isobaric line of mass 133 nuclei, the activity concentration of 133Xe immedi-
ately after the nuclear chain reaction ends is quite low. Under the assumption
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that the xenon isotopes are separated from their precursor isotopes at that time,
possible in-growth is inhibited and the activity concentration measured is only
depending on decay and the independent fission yields. Assuming full in-growth
causes the full cumulative yields to be generated. Opposing to radioactive de-
cay the rate of growth from precursors provokes the activity concentration to
increase.
Type of facility Order of magnitude of radioxenon release
Hospitals 103 Bq
Research laboratories 106 Bq
Nuclear power plants 109 Bq
Radiopharmaceutical plants 1012 − 1013 Bq
1kton nuclear explosion underground 1013 − 1015 Bq
1kton nuclear explosion atmospheric 1016 Bq
Table 1.2: The estimated order of magnitudes of radioxenon release from differ-
ent facilities and events. [Saey, 2007]
1.5 Environmental radioxenon background
To be able to distinguish civil radioxenon releases from nuclear explosions, the
radioxenon background of ambient ground level air needs to be studied. As men-
tioned earlier, the first atmospheric radioxenon measurements were performed
during World War II [Ziegler and Jacobson, 1995]. Later, in the 1960s, at-
mospheric samples were taken and measured by a group of scientists at the
University of Heidelberg in order to find traces of 85Kr and 133Xe originat-
ing from nuclear weapon tests. In 1961 signals indicating a nuclear explosion
have indeed been observed. Soviet nuclear weapon tests, conducted in the au-
tumn of 1961, are believed to be the source [Ehhalt et al., 1963]. Since the
1970s the Integrated Monitoring and Information System (IMIS) of Germany is
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recording radioxenon levels at seven different sites with a time resolution of one
week [Stockburger et al., 1977]. Contrary to INGE systems, the total activity
is measured by proportional counters integrating over all radioxenon isotopes.
However, a separation of two isotopes can be done by decay analysis.
The longest series of uninterrupted 133Xe activity concentration data were
recorded at the Freiburg station recorded from 1977 until 2009. The measured
values lie between 1 mBq/m3 and 100 mBq/m3 with one maximum at 106
Bq/m3. It was the one day sample taken on 1 May 1986, a few days after
the accident of Chernobyl.
The data from INGE systems within the IMS network contribute to getting
a better understanding of the environmental radioxenon background. The data
collected from six different stations in Europe between 2003 and 2008 are studied
in [Saey et al., 2010b]: Longyearbyen (Spitsbergen, Norway), Stockholm (Swe-
den), Dubna (Russia), Schauinsland Mountain (Germany), Bruye`res-le-Chaˆtel
and Marseille (France). Xenon−133 is the isotope most commonly seen in atmo-
spheric samples. Nuclear power reactors and radiopharmaceutical plants are to
be seen as the major sources. Thus it is regularly found at locations downwind
from nuclear power plants. In regions with a high density of nuclear reactors,
such as Central Europe, the mean activity concentration of 133Xe is found to be
between 5 mBq/m3 and 20 mBq/m3. At stations on the edge of that region, like
the Stockholm station, the activity concentrations range from 1.4 mBq/m3 to
2.4 mBq/m3. In the very remote area of Spitsbergen, far from nuclear reactors,
a mean activity concentration accounts for 0.2 mBq/m3. In general, the ra-
dioxenon background in Europe does not show any seasonal changes, except the
station at Spitspergen. In this case, atmospheric transport over long distances
is believed to affect the distribution of radioxenon in the atmosphere and add a
seasonal variability.
Today the average activity concentration of 133Xe in Germany lies around 6
mBq/m3. In 2006 a comprehensive field test was carried out in Seibersdorf, Aus-
tria. Within this campaign, mobile versions of the SAUNA and ARIX systems
collected 16 atmospheric and five sub-surface gas samples. The activity concen-
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tration of 133Xe was determined to be between 0.3 mBq/m3 and 2.4 mBq/m3
for most atmospheric samples. One pair of measurements, however, showed
a rather high activity concentration: (17 ± 1) mBq/m3 were detected by the
SAUNA system and (51± 3) mBq/m3 by the ARIX system [Axelsson, 2007].
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2 Scope of work
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its verification sys-
tem represent the conceptional background for this work. In order to establish a
reliable verification system different sources of radioxenon isotopes are modeled
and experimentally examined. This can provide valuable information about the
effects on the global radioxenon background. However, to this date experimen-
tal studies of radioxenon releases of nuclear research reactors are not found in
literature.
Therefore two measurement campaigns, one in May 2009 and one in October
2009, have been conducted at the Atominstitut of Vienna (ATI) using the mobile
SAUNA (Swedish Automatic Unit for Noble gas Acquisition) system, which was
assembled at the reactor platform. These campaigns were sponsored by the
CTBTO and the FOI in cooperation with the ATI of the TU Vienna.
The key objective of the experiments is to determine if there are releases of
radioxenons at concentrations capable of measurement for the SAUNA system
(> 1 mBq/m3). Furthermore, it aims to determine the radioxenon signature of
the reactor, i.e. the ratios of the different radioxenon isotopes. In addition to this
the releases of the irradiation tubes, which contain normal air, are analyzed for
the presence of radioxenon isotopes. A separate study focuses on the radioxenon
production of highly enriched uranium targets (93% 235U) while being irradiated
inside an irradiation tube.
Estimations concerning possible sources, the transport and the intensity of
the radioxenon release are performed and compared to the experimental results.
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3 Theory
3.1 Characteristics of the four xenon isotopes of
interest
3.1.1 General
Xenon (54Xe) is a colorless and odorless noble gas. Like all noble gases it is
in practice chemically inert. As a trace gas it is present in the Earth‘s atmo-
sphere with 0.087 ppm by volume [CRC, 1987]. There are 38 known isotopes,
seven of which are stable and two have half-lives over 1014 years [ENSDF, 2009].
Additionally, there are six metastable states of xenon. Only eight isotopes re-
spectively isomers have half-lives over six hours, which is the minimum required
for CTBT purposes. From a nuclear weapon test only four of these are produced
in sufficient amount as fission or activation products: 131mXe,133mXe,133Xe and
135Xe. These are the CTBT relevant xenon isotopes/isomers [De Geer, 2001].
The others (122Xe,125Xe,127Xe,129mXe) are neutron deficient and therefore un-
likely to be produced in fission or in a high neutron flux. Nevertheless some of
them are produced in nuclear medicine: For example, to gain 125I, natural xenon
is irradiated so that after the reaction 124Xe(n,γ)125Xe the product decays to
125I. The possibility of sampling xenon from such a source certainly demands
attention.
All CTBT relevant isotopes emit photons and beta or conversion electrons
in coincidence. The SAUNA noble gas measuring system, which is described in
detail later, uses beta-gamma coincidence techniques to create a two dimensional
spectrum. In this chapter all nuclear data is retrieved from [ENSDF, 2009], if
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not stated otherwise.
Figure 3.1: Decay schemes for 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe and 135Xe
3.1.2 131mXe
Xe-131m is a fission product that is produced when nuclear fuel is irradiated.
It is predominantly created by decay of 131I. Possible sources are reprocessing
plants and nuclear reactors. Also, when 133Xe is gained for medical purposes
131mXe will be present as a byproduct.
The heavily suppressed 163.9 keV (I = 1.95%) gamma transition is not coin-
cident with any beta signal so it cannot be seen in a beta-gamma coincidence
spectrum (but well in high resolution gamma spectrometry). Xe-131m primarily
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decays by sending out conversion electrons. The K shell conversion electron at
129.4 keV (I = 61.6%) and the L conversion electron at 158.8 keV (I = 28.8%)
are the most dominant ones. The conversion electrons are coincident with char-
acteristic X-rays: Kα around 29.7 keV and Kβ around 33.5 keV. The L X-rays
are all below 6 keV, where detector efficiencies are low, which makes them un-
favorable. So 131mXe is analyzed by its K conversion electron and the combined
K X-rays (I = 54%).
3.1.3 133mXe
Xe-133m is produced as a fission product as well as through excitation of 133Xe.
The main sources of 133mXe are nuclear explosions and radiopharmaceutical
facilities [Saey, 2007], [Saey, 2009].
With the half-life of 2.19 d it decays by isomeric transition to 133Xe. Again
the gamma line at 233.2 keV (I = 8.2%) is not useful for analysis in beta-gamma
coincidence spectrometry, since it is not coincident with any beta signal. Instead
of that its K conversion electron at 198.7 keV (I = 63.2%) is in coincidence with
X-rays, Kα around 29.7 keV and Kβ around 33.8 keV. Same as with
131mXe the
L conversion electrons are not practical.
3.1.4 133Xe
Xe-133 is a main fission product. In nuclear medicine it is being used for lung
function diagnostics. It is produced mainly by fission of 235U but also in smaller
amounts by irradiation of natural xenon gas: 132Xe(n,γ)133Xe. Xe-133 has a
long history in the records of radioxenon monitoring: The first environmental
measurements date back to World War II, when U.S. airplanes were used to
sample air over Germany to find traces of a German nuclear program by ana-
lyzing it for 133Xe [Ziegler and Jacobson, 1995]. Decades later 133Xe was being
measured during weapons tests. At that time 133Xe was only detected after an
atmospheric or poorly contained underground test.
Xe-133 is a beta emitter: In 99.2% it decays to the first excited state of stable
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133Cs with an end-point energy of 346 keV. The excited state has a 6.2 ns half-
life decaying to the ground state via 81.0 keV photons (I = 38.0%) or via 45
keV conversion electrons (I = 55.1%) in coincidence with X-rays. The combined
Kα X-rays lie at 30.8 keV (I = 40.3%), Kβ at 35.1 keV (I = 9.4%). Due to the
short half-life of 6.2 ns, the conversion electron together with the X-rays can be
seen coincident with the initial beta electron. This has the effect of adding 45
keV to the beta energy resulting in an end-point energy of 391 keV.
3.1.5 135Xe
Of all discussed xenon isotopes 135Xe has the highest independent fission yield
with 7.8×10−2%. This together with its high neutron absorption cross section of
2.65×106 b at 0.025 eV make 135Xe an important reactor poison [KAERI, 2010].
Because it subducts neutrons from the reactor core it decreases the reactivity
of a reactor. Reactor poisoning can even stop the nuclear chain reaction, when
strong enough. It can represent a serious hazard in reactor operation, if it is dealt
with incorrectly. Xe-135 is produced in large amounts in nuclear explosions. It
is as well released from nuclear reactors, especially after reactor shut-downs, and
from radiopharmaceutical plants.
Xe-135 decays via beta decay into 135Cs, mainly (I = 96%) into its first
excited state (T1/2 = 0.28 ns) at 294.8 keV. Again, because of the short half-life
it is detected in coincidence with beta electrons (end-point energy: 901 keV).
This coincidence is used for the quantification of 135Xe. Additionally there is a
K conversion electron of 213.8 keV (I = 5.7%), which, together with coincident
X-rays (I = 5.2%), has to be considered in analysis.
3.2 The SAUNA noble gas measuring system
3.2.1 General
The SAUNA system is an automatic xenon sampling and analyzing device. To-
gether with the net count calculation method for data analysis it has been devel-
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oped by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) [Ringbom et al., 2003]. It
was designed and developed to be part of the monitoring network of the CTBTO.
Within the IMS network the stationary SAUNA system is operated at 11 dif-
ferent locations worldwide. SAUNA consists of three main parts: a sampling, a
processing and a detector unit. For the purpose of on-site inspections a mobile
version, the SAUNA OSI system, has been developed. The mobile system only
consists of the sampling and processing units. It collects xenon and stores it in
exchangeable transport columns, which can be analyzed later by a detector unit
or in a lab system.
At a flow rate of around 1 m3/h, a four-hour-sample contains about 0.3 cm3
of xenon. For the most part this will be natural xenon and perhaps traces of
radioxenon. In addition to that, the sample will contain about 80% helium,
which is used as a carrier gas, but does not affect the later measurement at
all. Radon, a naturally occurring noble gas, is tried to be separated out during
sampling and processing. Especially 222Rn, which -of radon isotopes- has the
longest half-life of 3.8 d, can survive sampling and processing and worsen the
xenon sensitivity via its short-lived daughter nuclides. Nevertheless, traces of
radon will be found in almost every sample.
3.2.2 The mobile SAUNA OSI field sampler
The SAUNA OSI system is specifically designed for field use. Thus a main
aspect in the development was to keep the system as simple as possible without
being prone to environmental influences. It consists of eight portable boxes of
about 20 kg each that can be set up and connected within a few minutes.
By cooling and filtering, the air is purged of aerosols, water and carbon diox-
ide. Of the remaining air xenon is extracted using adsorption on activated
charcoal. Although the adsorption coefficient rapidly increases with decreas-
ing temperature [Underhill, 1996], sampling is performed at room-temperature.
SAUNA uses high pressure and long charcoal beds together with efficient concen-
tration techniques to achieve adsorption. Hence it does not need liquid nitrogen
or compressors to cool the charcoal, which has a positive effect on the systems
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simplicity, size, power consumption and cost. To allow uninterrupted sampling,
two sub-units, identical in construction, each able to collect xenon for up to 6
h. While one is sampling the other one undergoes desorption and regeneration.
A sampling pump sucks air and compresses it to an overpressure of about
8 bar. After this the air is being cooled down to −5 ◦C by a heat exchanger
and thermoelectric coolers. This initially removes some of the moisture. A 4 A˚
molecular sieve then removes remaining water and carbon dioxide. After this,
the air flows through four consecutive columns filled with coconut shell charcoal,
where xenon is adsorbed. The pressure drop across the sampling unit is around 2
bar. Before the air reaches the air outlet a volume meter determines the volume
of the sampled air.
The xenon collected during sampling can now be stored in a portable transport
column to be analyzed later. An evacuation pump provides an underpressure
of about 200 mbar when the sampling columns begin heating to about 300 ◦C.
Helium as a carrier gas is pulsed through the charcoal traps. This way xenon is
transferred to charcoal traps within the transport column. Again, residual water
and carbon dioxide are filtered in preceding 4A˚ molecular sieves. Two molecular
sieve columns together with one long spiral filled with activated charcoal make
up one transport column. Once the transfer has finished, the transport columns
can be disconnected and sent to a lab system. A more detailed description of the
stationary system can be found in [Ringbom et al., 2003], however some details,
like the system pressure, have changed by now [Lindh, 2009].
3.2.3 The SAUNA lab system
The lab system effectively comprises two parts: a gas chromatograph and the
beta and gamma detectors. The gas chromatograph has two purposes: a further
separation of xenon from other gases and the quantification of the total amount
of extracted xenon.
Once the transport column is connected, it is being heated slowly while helium
is pumped through. Because of the slow heating, light gases first begin to desorb
from the activated charcoal. A thermal conductivity detector within the gas
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Figure 3.2: A photograph of two transport columns.
chromatograph senses changes in the thermal conductivity of the flowing gas
mixture. Since most gases have a thermal conductivity much less than that of
helium, the resulting chromatogram shows directly the presence of gases other
than helium. This way, xenon can effectively be separated from lighter gases and
radon. The xenon peak appears about 30 minutes before the radon peak. To
determine the total volume of the xenon peak, the thermal conductivity detector
needs to be calibrated. This is done before all measurements by injecting a
known volume of stable xenon into the gas chromatograph carried by a helium
flow. During the time window of the xenon peak, the gas flow is directed to
the detector unit. The total output volume, however, is about 50 cm3 whereas
the detector cell volume is only 6.4 cm3. A volume reduction is achieved by an
aluminum column with 12 cm length and 3 mm in diameter including 0.5 g of
carbogenic molecular sieve (CMS). Xenon is able to adsorb to the CMS before
the residual carrier gas is evacuated. Then the column is heated to 350 ◦C and
the sample is transferred into the detector cell, that has already been evacuated.
This is performed by a combination of volumetric transfer and carrier gas. The
sample volume in the detector cell accords to 6 cm3. This means that, assuming
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1 cm3 xenon in one typical sample, it still contains about 5 cm3 of carrier gas
and traces of other gases.
The activity of the sample is measured by beta-gamma detectors. A cylindrical
plastic scintillator works as a beta detector. It is produced by Bicron from
BC404 material. The sample is injected into the volume inside the scintillator
cell with a small stainless steel pipe. The plastic scintillator resides in a hole
in the middle of a NaI(Tl) crystal, which is used as a gamma detector. Photo
multipliers (PMs) are arranged on both ends of the scintillator cell as well as on
the NaI(Tl) crystal and are connected to the electronic readout set-up.
Figure 3.3: Schematic view of the detector system. Picture taken from [Ringbom
et al., 2003]
3.2.4 Detector calibration
The detectors need to be calibrated in energy and efficiency. Different techniques
are applied for the calibration of the detector system [Reeder et al., 2004], [Saey
and De Geer, 2007]:
• Gamma energy calibration
The NaI(Tl) detector is calibrated in a standard way by using point sources
while the beta-coincidence requirement is bypassed. Providing several use-
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ful peaks in the energy range of interest, the most commonly used nuclides
are: 152Eu with useful gamma peaks at 121.8,163.9,244.7 and 344.3 keV
and 137Cs which has one gamma line at 661.7 keV.
• Beta energy calibration
The beta energy calibration of the plastic scintillator cell is performed uti-
lizing Compton scattering from a gamma source external to the detector
[Reeder et al., 2004]. The 661.7 keV photons of 137Cs are used for this,
while the detector system is recording in beta-gamma coincidence mode.
Incident gammas scatter in the scintillator material, producing a free re-
coil electron. The recoil electron is likely to be stopped within the plastic
scintillator, giving off its total kinetic energy. The scattered gamma is
measured in the NaI(Tl) detector. Of course, not every Compton scatter-
ing event in the plastic scintillator will deliver a useful signal: The recoil
electron could leave the plastic scintillator or the scattered gamma could
leave the NaI(Tl) crystal without being detected. But in general, the 2D
array will show a distribution of events along a diagonal line on which
the added energies of the beta and gamma detectors equal the full energy
of the incident gamma. Now, if a single gamma channel is selected, the
corresponding beta spectrum will show a peak. The energy of this peak is
given by the Compton equation:
Eβ = E0 − Eγ (3.1)
Eβ ... the beta energy
E0 ... the energy of the initial gamma (661.7 keV)
Eγ ... the energy of the scattered gamma
The beta calibration curve can now be obtained by correlating the beta
energy (Eβ) given through equation 3.1 to the channel number of center
of the Gaussian fitted peak. However, this does not take into account the
resolution broadening of the beta and gamma detector. This causes small
energy shifts, which can be evaluated by Monte Carlo N-Particle modeling.
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The total energy shift is given as [Reeder et al., 2004]:
∆E = 25.33keV − 0.1215(Eβ) + 0.0001646(keV )−1(Eβ)2 (3.2)
∆E ... energy shift
Eβ ... the uncorrected beta energy [keV]
• Efficiency calibration
The total beta-gamma efficiency βγ can be obtained after the gamma
efficiency γ and the beta efficiency β were determined using following
simple relation:
βγ = β × γ (3.3)
In a series of measurements, samples of the isotopes 133Xe, 222Rn and
131mXe are filled into the detector. The isotopes 133Xe and 222Rn are used
to obtain the relative photon efficiency for the entire relevant energy range,
while the absolute efficiency is determined measuring a 131mXe sample.
In case of 133Xe, which shows peaks at 32 keV and 81 keV, the relative
efficiencies are related to each other:
γ(81) =
I81
I32
× R32
R81
× γ(32) (3.4)
I81 ... measured intensity of the peak at 81keV
I32 ... measured intensity of the peak at 32keV
R81 ... branching ratio for the 81keV gamma decay
R32 ... branching ratio for electron conversion
The same applies for 214Pb, a daughter nuclide of 222Rn, which has gamma
lines at 242 keV, 295 keV and 352 keV. In addition to that it has several
unresolved X-rays between 75 keV and 87 keV. Assuming that the relative
efficiency does not change drastically, the X-ray region around 80 keV is
assigned to the efficiency γ(81) at 81 keV. By doing this, the relative
efficiency curve for the gamma region between 32 keV and 352 keV can be
found.
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Now the total efficiency can be calculated. Two spectra of a 131mXe sample
are recorded: one in beta singles and one in beta-gamma coincidence mode.
The comparison of the 129 keV conversion electron peak area in the beta
spectrum with the same peak in the beta-gamma spectrum gives a measure
of the total efficiency, because the conversion electron is coincident with a
32 keV photon:
γ(32) =
Ixray
Itot
(3.5)
Ixray ... measured intensity of the peak in coincidence with X-rays
Itot ... measured total intensity of the beta peak
With the relative efficiencies and the absolute efficiency at 32 keV at hand,
the absolute gamma efficiencies can easily be calculated for the entire
energy region.
The total beta efficiency is acquired by comparing the total intensity of the
photon peaks of e.g. 133Xe (32 keV and 81 keV) obtained in gamma singles
mode to the same peaks in a beta-coincident 2D spectrum. Integrating the
beta distribution at a certain gamma energy gives the electron-coincident
intensity for one ROI, divided by the total intensity that gives the total
efficiency:
β(integrated) =
Ico
Itot
(3.6)
Ico ... measured intensity of the γ-peak coincident with beta particles
Itot ... measured total intensity of the gamma peak
With the knowledge of β and γ the beta-gamma efficiency is given via
equation 3.3.
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3.3 The TRIGA Mark II reactor
3.3.1 Design and physical properties
TRIGA reactors are open-pool reactors used for Training, Research and Isotope
production and are produced by General Atomics. They are widely spread over
the world and reach from 10 kW to 14 MW (thermal) in continuous power
output. It is an inherently safe design, meaning that safety is guaranteed by the
laws of nuclear physics, rather than engineering.
On March 7 1962 the TRIGA Mark II reactor of the Atominstitut of Vienna
went critical for the first time. The reactor has a maximum continuous power
output of 250 kW. As of the time of both experimental campaigns, the core
contained 84 circular arranged fuel rods. A start-up neutron source (Sb-Be) is
placed on the outmost edge of the reactor core. As long as all of the three control
rods, which use boron carbide as absorber material, stay inserted, the assembly
remains subcritical. Withdrawing the control rods from the core lets the reactor
become critical and after roughly one minute the maximum power output is
reached. The fuel rods contain a mixture of enriched uranium and zirconium-
hydride. Zirconium-hydride works as the main moderator. Most of the neutrons,
generated by fission, are moderated by the hydrogen nuclides inside the fuel.
Zirconium-hydride has a negative temperature coefficient, which means with
increasing temperature the efficiency as a moderator decreases. Unmoderated
neutrons, however, are more unlikely to induce fission reactions, due to the
1/v dependence of the fission cross section. This is sometimes referred to as the
warm neutron principle and it is the reason for the inherent safety of the reactor.
Three different types of fuel rods are being used:
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Fuel material Type 102 Type 104 Type 110(FLIP)
Uranium content 8.5wt.% 8.5wt.% 8.5wt.%
Enrichment 20%235U 20%235U 70%235U
H/Zr ratio 1.0 1.65 1.65
Cladding
Material aluminum stainless steel stainless steel
Wall thickness 0.76 mm 0.51 mm 0.51 mm
Dimensions
Outer diameter 37.5 mm 37.5 mm 37.5 mm
Length 72.06 cm 72.06 cm 72.06 cm
Table 3.1: The three different types of fuel rods
The reactor can also be operated in a pulsed mode: During the time span of
40ms the maximum neutron flux increases from 1 × 1013 cm−2s−1 to 1 × 1016
cm−2s−1 and the thermal power output from 250 kW to 250 MW. The temper-
ature inside the core rises to 360 ◦C during a pulse, compared to 200 ◦C during
normal operation at 250 kW. Because of the negative temperature coefficient the
increasing temperature reduces the reactivity and brings the power level back
into the kW-range. The reactor is equipped with six dry irradiation tubes, that
lead from the pool surface down to the reactor core, one of which right into the
middle of the core.
On December 12 1984 during a practical training course a fuel element failure
occurred while the reactor was operated in pulsed mode [Bo¨ck et al., 1987].
During the next days, an increased activity was observed in the reactor hall. The
aerosol detector registered up to 800 counts per second, which is a considerable
increase to the usual value of about 20 to 30 counts per second. The measured
activity then decreased by time and converged the normal value. A second
reactor pulse again led to an increased activity measured in the reactor hall, so
it was clear that a damage of the fuel rod cladding had occurred.
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Damages to the cladding of fuel elements can originate either from mechanical
stress or chemical reactions. Cladding corrosion can be prevented by the use of
high-purity water, a conductivity of less than 0.1 µS/cm is desirable. Mechanical
damage can arise out of thermal stress or when fuel rods are frequently handled,
as in a research reactor.
3.3.2 Fuel inventory and estimated radioxenon emissions
The burn-up of the fuel is very small due to the low power level of the reactor.
Many of the fuel elements that were loaded into the core in 1962 are still in
operation. Burn-up calculations were performed for every single fuel element
using the reactor physics software ORIGEN 2.2 [Khan, 2010]. In support of these
calculations, a number of fuel elements were analyzed for 137Cs concentrations
showing good agreement with the calculations. As a byproduct the amount of
235U was obtained for every fuel element. According to this the total amount of
235U within the core was calculated to be 3561 grams on June 30, 2009.
In [Fouquet et al., 2003] it is reported that the cladding provides total clad
integrity at temperatures up to 1150 ◦C. Furthermore, the UZrH fuel itself should
retain 99.9% of all volatile fission products even without any cladding. The 133Xe
equilibrium inventory of a reactor constantly operated at 250 kW yields a total
133Xe activity of 5.8 × 1014 Bq [De Geer, 2009]: A damaged cladding of one
of the 84 elements assumed, 0.1% could leak through giving a total activity of
around 7 GBq. Estimating a tent volume of about 10 m3 and 100% effective
transport would yield 0.7 GBq/m3. Such an activity would cause a huge signal
for the SAUNA. However, an unnoticed leak is not very probable.
Conditional to manufacturing fuel elements are often slightly contaminated on
the outside. A typical value commonly used at CERCA-AREVA is a maximum
alpha contamination of 1.7 Bq/dm2 [Bo¨ck, 2009]. The surface of a single fuel
element lies around 0.085 m2. For 84 fuel elements this gives a maximum total
alpha contamination of 1214 Bq. Further, assuming an overall concentration of
20% 235U and 80% 238U leads to a total amount of 9.3× 10−3 g of 235U outside
the fuel elements. This equals to around 0.02% of an average fuel elements
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inventory of 235U resulting in an 133Xe activity concentration of approximately
0.1 GBq/m3 in the plastic tent. Note that this approximation is not considering
the burn-up for the time the fuel rod spent in the reactor core, nor the dissolution
of uranium into the reactor water and its constant removal by an ion exchanger,
which cleans the reactor water. Taking this into account will probably lead to
a much smaller total amount of 235U outside the fuel elements.
3.3.3 Transport of xenon through the reactor
Neglecting the contamination outside the fuel elements, radioxenon isotopes
are mainly produced within the fuel meat. Subsequently, for radioxenon to be
measured above the pool surface it has to overcome the barrier of the cladding,
migrate through the pool water and into the air.
Assuming a leak in the cladding, through which xenon could be released into
the water, three different processes are possible [De Geer, 2009]:
1. Diffusion followed by emanation:
The diffusion constant of xenon in water is (D = 2.2± 0.4)× 10−5 cm2/s
[Wolber et al., 1998]. The diffusion length (LD = 2
√
Dt) is the character-
istic scale measuring how far the substance has propagated through the
medium in the time t. For the time span of one day, this gives a diffusion
length of 2.7 cm. Thus, classical diffusion as means of transport can be
neglected.
2. Convection followed by emanation:
Convection is naturally established during reactor operation due to tem-
perature differences in the reactor water. Arguably, convection can pro-
vide mixing much quicker than through diffusion. Assuming total mixing
of xenon in the water, there would still be the problem of emanation from
the water surface into the air. This, however, would probably be a rather
slow process.
3. Gas bubbles bursting at the water surface:
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During continuous operation the fuel elements can heat up to 200 ◦C. This
causes gas bubbles to constantly form at the surface of the fuel elements
and rise to the pool surface once the buoyancy overcomes the contact
forces. This process is frequently observed at the TRIGA reactor in Vi-
enna. It seems reasonable that leaking radioxenon can get caught and
transported to the surface within the steam bubbles.
On the whole it is safe to say, that the role of classical diffusion in the transport
of xenon through the reactor water is negligible. The most probable way for
radioxenon to reach the water surface is via steam bubbles.
3.4 The analysis procedure
3.4.1 General
This section gives a short description of the analysis procedure that is applied
after the raw data is obtained from the beta-gamma coincidence set-up. It is
implemented in analyzing software programs such as “bganalyze”, the software
used at the CTBTO, or “XECON”, the FOI software. This method, as it
is presented here, requires the assumption that we will not be dealing with
extraordinarily low count rates, so the approximation from Binomial to Poisson
distribution is justified.
All methods and calculations, that are described in this section, are found in
[De Geer, 2007] if not stated otherwise. In the following formulae, all stochastic
variables are assigned a color according to the statistics they follow: Red stands
for Poisson distributed, blue for Gaussian distributed variables. Black stochastic
variables are used for their true means or estimated (by measurement) true
means. Constants are represented by black symbols.
3.4.2 The Net Count Calculation (NCC) method
To relate the measured counts to a certain isotope, regions of interest (ROI)
within the two-dimensional spectrum are defined. The net count value is then
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obtained after a subtraction of background radiation and the interference of
other nuclides. The ambient background is measured to quantify the natural
radiation background of the particular detector set-up. It can vary depending on
natural conditions like elevation above sea level. Interference counts are caused
by daughter products of 222Rn, which could be contaminating the sample, or
other radioxenon isotopes.
222Rn has a half-life of 3.8 d, long enough to survive the processing time.
While 222Rn itself is an alpha emitter, its daughter nuclides 214Bi (T1/2 = 19.9
m) and 214Pb (T1/2 = 26.8 m) emit betas coincident with gamma radiation.
They will, therefore, be seen in the beta-gamma spectrum. Because of their
short half-lives they are in equilibrium with 222Rn, so the quantification of one
daughter nuclide can be used to calculate the total radon contamination.
This is done via the 351, 9 keV (I = 35.6%) gamma from an isomeric state
of 214Bi in the decay of 214Pb. Because of its short half-life of less than 0.1 ns
it delivers a signal coincident with the beta signal. The presence of 222Rn has
an impact on all radioxenon ROIs. However, by knowing the total amount of
222Rn all interferences can be subtracted from the 2D array.
Interference is caused also by Compton scattering and X-rays from other ra-
dioxenon isotopes. It is clear that there is only interference from higher to lower
gamma energies.
Additionally, the “memory effect” contributes possible interference: traces of
radioxenon from a previous sample might still be present in the detector cell.
Xenon as well as radon are able to diffuse into the walls of the scintillation cell
and stay there even after the vial had been flushed and evacuated. Hence a gas
background measurement is taken before every sample to correct for the memory
effect.
In summary, the calculation of the net counts can be expressed [Saey and De
Geer, 2007]:
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Figure 3.4: The 10 regions of interest in a two dimensional beta-gamma coinci-
dence spectrum. Picture taken from [De Geer, 2007]
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ROI Counts
minus Ambient Background
minus Interference from 222Rn
minus Interference from other radioxenon isotopes
minus Decay corrected Memory Effect
Net Counts
To quantify the effect of interference, factors of the form Ri/j are introduced:
Ri/j is defined as the ratio between the counts in ROI i and the counts in ROI
j for a sample, in which only the nuclide of ROI j is present. Interferences
can only originate from the ROIs j=1 (214Pb), j=2 (135Xe) and j=3 (133Xe, 81
keV). In general, they include both Compton scattering from primary radiation
and possible primary radiation of the owner nuclide of ROI j within the ROI
i. These factors are determined in the initial calibration process. Note that
all Ri/j factors vanish for i ≤ j as there is no interference from lower to higher
gamma energies. Ri/j is set to zero if the activity concentration of the interfering
nuclide (the owner nuclide of ROI j) is determined to lie below the critical level
LC . The LC gives a value for the activity concentration under which the nuclide
is treated as “not present”. The calculation of LC will be described in detail in
section 3.4.3.
Thus, the signal in ROI i can be calculated for the gas background and the
sample with the general expressions:
di = [Di −Ri/1D1 −Ri/2D2 −Ri/3D3]− kg[Bi −Ri/1B1 −Ri/2B2 −Ri/3B3]
ci = [Ci −Ri/1C1 −Ri/2C2 −Ri/3C3]− ks[Bi −Ri/1B1 −Ri/2B2 −Ri/3B3]
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di ... the signal in the gas background corrected for ambient
background and interferences
ci ... the signal in the sample corrected for ambient background
and interferences
Di ... the gross signal in ROI i in the gas background
Ci ... the gross signal in ROI i in the sample
Bi ... the signal in ROI i in the detector background, i.e the
ambient background
Ri/j ... the interference contribution of ROI i into ROI j
kg ... the ratio of the live counting time of the gas background
divided by the live counting time of the detector background
ks ... the ratio of the live counting time of the gas background
divided by the live counting time of the sample background
In the next step the net count value can be obtained by subtracting the signal
in the gas background corrected for radioactive decay from the signal in the
sample:
ni = ci − Fidi (3.7)
ni ... the net count value for ROI i
Fi ... the decay correction factor
Without a derivation (can be found in appendix 1 of [De Geer, 2007]), the decay
correction factor Fi is given as:
Fi =
tcLtdR
tcRtdL
e−λiτ
1− e−λitcR
1− e−λitdR (3.8)
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λi ... decay constant for owner nuclide of ROI i
τ ... time between the beginning of the gas background measurement
and the sample measurement
tcR ... real time between the beginning of the sample measurement
and the end of the sample measurement
tcL ... live time between the beginning of the sample measurement
and the end of the sample measurement
tdR ... real time between the beginning of the gas background
measurement and the end of the gas background measurement
tdL ... live time between the beginning of the gas background
measurement and the end of the gas background measurement
Which leads us to the explicit expression of the net count value:
ni = Ci −Ri/1C1 −Ri/2C2 −Ri/3C3 − FiDi + FiRi/1D1 + FiRi/2D2
+FiRi/3D3 − (ks − Fikg)Bi + (ksRi/1 − FikgRi/1)B1
+(ksRi/2 − FikgRi/2)B2 + (ksRi/3 − FikgRi/3)B3
(3.9)
Consequently, the activity concentration ACi is calculated by multiplying the
net count value by a correction factor Hi, that includes detector efficiency, the
branching ratio and radioactive decay during processing.
ACi = Hini (3.10)
with:
Hi =
tcRtS
tcL
· λ
2
i
IiV (1− e−λitS)e−λitP (1− e−λitcR)Bq/m
3 (3.11)
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λi ... decay constant for owner nuclide of ROI i
tcR ... real time between the beginning of the sample measurement
and the end of the sample measurement
tcL ... live time between the beginning of the sample measurement
and the end of the sample measurement
tS ... sampling time
tP ... processing time
Ii ... detector efficiency times the branching ratio of the ROI i
V ... total sample air volume
Again the full derivation can be found in [De Geer, 2007]. From these lin-
ear expressions the expectation values E(ni) and E(ACi) can be obtained by
simply replacing all stochastic variables by their estimated true mean, which
corresponds to the measured value (red changes to black):
E(ni) = Ci −Ri/1C1 −Ri/2C2 −Ri/3C3 − FiDi + FiRi/1D1 + FiRi/2D2
+FiRi/3D3 − (ks − Fikg)Bi + (ksRi/1 − FikgRi/1)B1
+(ksRi/2 − FikgRi/2)B2 + (ksRi/3 − FikgRi/3)B3
(3.12)
and
E(ACi) = HiE(ni) (3.13)
The Variances V (ni) and V (ACi) are calculated using a general expression
that holds for any two independent stochastic variables A and B:
V (aA± bB) = a2V (A) + b2V (B)
In case of Poisson variables, V (A) is estimated by A and V (B) is estimated by
B, leading to:
V (aA± bB) = a2A+ b2B
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This holds for an arbitrary number of independent variables. This leads to:
V (ni) = Ci −R2i/1C1 −R2i/2C2 −R2i/3C3 − F 2i Di + F 2i R2i/1D1 + F 2i R2i/2D2
+F 2i R
2
i/3D3 − (ks − Fikg)2Bi + (ksRi/1 − FikgRi/1)2B1
+(ksRi/2 − FikgRi/2)2B2 + (ksRi/3 − FikgRi/3)2B3
(3.14)
and
V (ACi) = H
2
i V (ni) (3.15)
3.4.3 Calculation of the Minimum Detectable Concentration
When analyzing an actual measurement it is important to be able to decide if
a signal is present or not. Furthermore, the sensitivity of this decision needs to
be quantified. Assuming a Gaussian process that produces a background count,
it is difficult to determine if a substance was present and which risk is involved,
when the measured gross count comes close to the true mean of the background.
In [Currie, 1968] Lloyd Currie describes a concept of detection limits in which
he introduces a critical limit, LC , and a detection limit, LD. The concept
requires the approximation from Binomial distribution to Poisson distribution
and further to Gaussian distribution to hold. LC is used to determine if a signal
is present, it is calculated after the measurement. LD, however, describes the
measurement as such even before it is carried out [De Geer, 2004]. However, since
we are dealing with probability distributions, these limits are inevitably related
to risk. There is a probability to falsely decide that a substance is present, when
in fact it is not (Type I error) and the probability to falsely determine a signal
to be absent when in fact it is present (Type II error). In both cases a risk
needs to be taken and it is common to apply the same risk to both types. This
corresponds to a fractile k of the distribution. At e.g. k = 1.645 the involved
risk corresponds to 5%. Currie derived the expressions of LC and LD by using
the characteristics of the Gaussian distribution:
LC = k
√
µ
(
1 +
1
m
)
(3.16)
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LD = k
2 + 2LC (3.17)
µ ... the true mean of the background signal
m ... the number of background measurements
k ... the fractile of the Gaussian distribution
The general expression for LC can be simplified assuming a well known true
mean of the background signal. This is justified by a detector background mea-
surement which is by far longer than the sample measurements. Furthermore, in
case of a Gaussian distribution µ equals to the variance V0 (σ0
2). For all ROIs
i, that gives:
LCi = k
√
V0(ni) (3.18)
and
LDi = k
2 + 2LCi (3.19)
Now, on closer examination of the equations 3.12 and 3.14 it is clear that, when
subtracting E(ni) from V (ni), Ci is being cancelled out. Thus, the difference
is independent of the number of counts in the ROI i. Since it holds for all i,
it also applies to the special case of E(ni) = 0 ≡ E0(ni), i.e. only background
radiation counts.
This means:
V (ni)− E(ni) = V0(ni)− E0(ni) (3.20)
and further:
V0(ni) = V (ni)− E(ni) (3.21)
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Figure 3.5: Two Gaussian distributions of net counts at true means of 0 and
LD with their corresponding standard derivations σ0(=
√
V0) and
σD(=
√
VD).
Looking at figure 3.5 equation 3.18 becomes clear and equation 3.19 can be
derived:
LDi = LCi + k
√
VD(ni) = LCi + k
√
V0(ni) + LDi (3.22)
Where we used equation 3.20 for VD(ni) = V0(ni) + LDi. Solving equation
3.22 gives equation 3.19.
Applying this on the derived values ACi gives:
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V (ACi)−HiE(ACi) = V0(ACi)−HiE0(ACi) (3.23)
Now, the factor Hi has to be considered when we calculate the critical limit,
LCACi, and the detection limit, LDACi, of the activity concentrations:
LCACi = k
√
V0(ni) (3.24)
and
LDACi = Hik
2 + 2LCACi ≡MDC (3.25)
LDACi is also called the Minimum Detectable Concentration, or MDC.
3.4.4 Corrections and revisions
During the short description of the analysis methods details were implicitly ne-
glected and circumstances were simplified for the sake of a profound uncompli-
cated illustration of the theory. However, embracing these corrections increases
the accuracy and correctness of the data analysis. It is not intended to present
every correction and its derivation in detail, but to advise the reader of these
issues. The interested reader can find all derivations in [De Geer, 2007].
• Growth correction for 133mXe→133 Xe
During transport, processing and sample measurement there is a contin-
uous decay of 133mXe into 133Xe. Thus, taking this feed into account,
a corrective calculation for the activity concentration of 133Xe has to be
performed both for the sample and the gas background. Note that this
correction only affects 133Xe-ROIs, the calculation of the activity concen-
trations and the MDC.
• Merging data from different ROIs and the resulting covariances
In case of 133Xe several ROIs can be used to determine the total activity
concentration (ROI 3,4,7,8,9,10). In any case the outcome will be more
accurate using all possible information than using solely ROI 3. As long
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as the measured concentrations of 131mXe (ROI 5) and 133mXe (ROI 6)
stay below their critical limits, ROI 3 and ROI 4 are used. If, however,
one or both metastable nuclides are measured above the critical limit, the
ROIs 7 and 8 can be used to calculate the 133Xe activity concentration.
The general solution in such a case is a weighted average of the activity
concentrations, that minimizes the total variance:
V (ACW ) =
AC1
V (AC1)
+ AC2
V (AC2)
1
V (AC1)
+ 1
V (AC2)
(3.26)
Calculating V (ACW ), a covariance term must be added, since the different
channels are not statistically independent. This impacts the variances for
133mXe but it has no effect on the expectation values.
• Covariance in the gas background
When the gas background ROIs are subtracted from the sample ROIs,
covariances arise because both terms rely on the value (and the variance)
of the detector background Bi at a given ROI i. In the description these
terms were disregarded.
3.5 Classification of radioxenon samples
Many civilian facilities legally release radioxenon isotopes on a regular basis. It
is of vital importance for the verification of compliance with the CTBT to be
able to distinguish nuclear explosion scenarios from civilian sources. To support
this, a number of methods for the characterization of radioxenon measurements
are under investigation. In practice the data fusion with measurements from
different technologies and a profound knowledge of the ambient radioxenon level
are used to gain confidence about the origin of one sample. Nevertheless, there
is a need for universal criteria applicable for radioxenon measurements and ap-
propriate for source discrimination.
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Single isotopic radioxenon activity ratios can help to differentiate between
different sources, especially nuclear explosions from civil sources [Meyers, 1998],
[Heimbigner et al., 2002]. The four radioxenon isotopes lead to six possible
isotopic ratios, for reasons of simplicity the nuclide with the longer half-life
as the denominator: 135Xe/133mXe, 135Xe/133Xe, 135Xe/131mXe, 133mXe/133Xe,
133mXe/131mXe and 133Xe/131mXe. Nuclear explosions yield isotopic ratios that
are above typical reactor emissions. However, any initial ratio will change with
time due to radioactive decay and follow an exponential decrease. This opens
a time margin of a couple of days, during which a nuclear explosion can clearly
be distinguished from reactor emissions. On the other hand, reactor emissions
are never unambiguous, using only single isotopic ratios.
A robust method relying on the relationships of two different isotopic activity
ratios was suggested in [Kalinowski et al., 2010]. The method requires two
conditions, the detection of at least three different radioxenon isotopes and one
single source as origin of these isotopes. It uses a set of plots that represent
the relation of one isotopic activity ratio to another for analysis. Each plot is
divided into two regions, the civil and the explosion domain, by a separation
line. While the exact position of the separation line is still under investigation,
first approximations are found in [Kalinowski et al., 2010]. A main advantage
of this method is its independence from radioactive decay. Any combination of
isotopic ratios will move along the separation line without crossing it.
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Figure 3.6: Source discrimination plot containing data of INGE measurements,
calculated isotopic ratios typical for a nuclear explosion as well as
emissions calculated for a light water reactor. Picture taken from
[Kalinowski et al., 2010]
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4 The measurement campaigns at
the TRIGA reactor in Vienna
4.1 Experimental schedule and setup
Two campaigns of measurements were carried out during the time from 25 May
until 29 May 2009 and from 27 October until 3 November with a SAUNA sam-
pler. The transport columns were sent to the lab of the Swedish Defence Re-
search Agency (FOI) in Stockholm for radionuclide analysis. The experimental
schedule of both campaigns included following experiments:
• The background sample: After one weekend without reactor operation,
this is the first sample taken.
• A sample during normal reactor operation: While the reactor is at a con-
stant power of 250 kWth, the air above the water surface of the reactor is
sampled.
• A sample during reactor operation without active cooling: While the re-
actor operates at a constant power output of 250 kWth, the active cooling
circuit of the water is shut down.
• Irradiated air from five irradiation tubes: After a definite time span of
reactor operation, the air inside of five irradiation tubes is sampled.
• Irradiation of a target containing HEU (93% 235U) (total weight: 240.2 µg
HEU): With an Uranium target in one irradiation tube and the reactor at
full power, nitrogen gas flushes the target and is sampled.
56
• Irradiation of a target containing HEU (93% 235U) with a cadmium shield-
ing (this experiment was only performed during the second campaign; total
weight of target: 237.7 µg HEU): Cd-113, which occurs in natural cadmium
at an abundance of 12.22%, has a neutron absorption cross section of 20647
b at 0.025 eV [KAERI, 2010]. Thus, natural cadmium provides efficient
shielding from thermal neutrons and only epithermal and fast neutrons
can reach the target and induce fission.
In preparation of the experiments a plastic foil was taped down to the ground of
the reactor platform including the handrail around the reactor pool. Its purpose
is to prohibit the air above the reactor surface to mix with the air in the reactor
hall. However, it was not tried to build up a completely airtight boundary. In
fact, the air intake of the SAUNA system requires an airflow into the “plastic
tent”. Between the water surface and the reactor platform, there are a few gaps,
through which air can flow. By letting these gaps open, a circulation of air is
established during sampling.
The active water cooling of the reactor is provided by a spray of cool water
at approximately half the height of the water tank. It establishes two circular
water currents, one warm current around the core of the reactor and one cool
current above. Besides active cooling, its main purpose is to slow down the rise
of radioactive nuclides, mainly 16N (T1/2 = 7.13 s), which is being produced in
16O(n,p)16N reactions in the water close to the reactor core during operation
[Steinhauser, 2009].
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Figure 4.1: Two photos os the reactor platform: The first one without the plas-
tic tent and the second one with the plastic tent and the SAUNA
sampler in the background.
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Figure 4.2: A picture of one uranium target placed inside a hose. The smaller
hose carrying the nitrogen inflow is not visible.
The uranium targets originate from old fission chambers and are composed of
highly enriched uranium (93% HEU). A target is placed at one end of a hose,
that has been closed tightly. Another hose of smaller diameter is added inside
the first hose and connected with a nitrogen gas bottle. The wider hose leads
to the SAUNA field sampler. This way, the nitrogen gas can pick up volatile
fission products from the target, while it is irradiated, and transport them to
the SAUNA system.
In the last experiment the effect of induced fission by unmoderated neutrons
is investigated. Cadmium has a very high cross section for thermal neutrons
and is therefore used as a filter for thermal neutrons. For this experiment the
uranium target was fully surrounded by a 2 mm cadmium coating.
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Although initially only one campaign was planned, a number of problems
arose during and after the execution of the experiments that eventually led to
the wish to re-run the experiments [Henriksson, 2009]. One problem was a high
concentration of carbon dioxide in the samples. Carbon dioxide is believed to
adsorb to activated charcoal and, in high concentrations, is able to occupy areas
of the active surface decreasing the overall xenon sampling efficiency. Thus, for
most samples it was not possible to quantify the total radioxenon amount that
was sampled in the gas chromatograph. Further, due to unexpected unavailabil-
ity of the detector in Freiburg (Germany), the samples had to be measured on
a non-calibrated detector in Kista (Sweden).
4.2 Processing and analysis of the samples
4.2.1 First experimental campaign
The gas chromatograms of the experiments of the first campaign were very
difficult to interpret, probably due to CO2 saturation. The amount of xenon
could, therefore, not be determined for all the samples. In addition an error
occurred during the transfer of the samples 2, 4 and 6, so that the amount of
xenon remained unclear. The samples 3, 5, and 8 were severely affected by
CO2 saturation, which made a volume estimation impossible. Sample 7 was
measured after sample 9, which was rather strong in activity, and suffered from
memory effects. The only samples suitable to obtain reasonable data from this
first campaign were samples 1 and 9.
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Air vol.
[m3]
Expected
Xe vol. [ml]
Sampled Xe
vol. [ml]
Yield [%] Operation mode
1 9.1 0.80 0.26 33 Background
2 7.9 0.69 n/a n/a 250kW; active cooling
3 17.9 1.57 n/a n/a 250kW; active cooling
4 7.1 0.62 n/a n/a 250kW; without
active cooling
5 17.8 1.55 n/a n/a 250kW; active cooling
6 6.9 0.60 n/a n/a 250kW; active cooling
7 17.5 1.53 n/a n/a 250kW; active cooling
8 0.080 0.0070 n/a n/a Irradiation tubes
9 0.072 0.0063 0.09 1429 Irradiation of HEU target
Table 4.1: The experiments of the first campaign. Data taken from [Ringbom
et al., 2009]
Sample 1 shows a fairly low sampling yield, probably due to problems during
sample transfer into the transport column. On the other hand sample 9 has an
extremely large yield. The very small amount of xenon in sample 9 is believed
to result in an inaccurate quantification in the gas chromatograph. More im-
portantly, nitrogen was used as a carrier gas from the uranium target to the
SAUNA system, which makes the total amount of xenon hard to estimate.
4.2.2 Second experimental campaign
Prior to the second campaign the detector system SEL01 in Kista was properly
calibrated with respect to energy and efficiency. Because of the CO2 problem
during the first campaign, an additional CO2 remover including a basic solution
was placed in front of the intake air duct for the samples 4 and 5. CO2 as an
acidic gas can be absorbed flowing through a basic solution, for which NaOH
was used. Moreover, one extra water filter was inserted for all samples.
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Air vol.
[m3]
Expected Xe
vol.(STP) [ml]
Sampled Xe
vol. [ml]
Yield [%] Operation mode
1 9.98 0.79 0.002 0.3 Background
2 5.77 0.45 0.042 9 250kW; active cooling
3 1.23 0.10 0.105 105 250kW; without active
cooling
4 5.71 0.45 0.5 111 250kW; active cooling;
extra CO2 remover
5 1.24 0.10 0.104 104 250kW; without active
cooling; CO2 remover
6 0.19 0.015 0.03 200 Irradiation tubes
7 0.44 0.035 0.008 23 Irradiated HEU target
8 0.38 0.03 0.003 10 Irradiated HEU target;
cadmium shielding
9 2.94 0.23 0.25 109 Background
10 3.01 0.24 0.26 108 250kW; active cooling
Table 4.2: The experiments of the second campaign. Data were taken from
[Ringbom et al., 2009]
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The sampling of the background failed because of untight hoses within the
helium supply, sample 1 is therefore not useful for analysis. Sample 2 shows
a rather low xenon yield, the reasons for this are not fully understood until
now. Sample 6 has a yield far above 100%, likely due to the same reasons as
in sample 9 of the first campaign. Number 7 and 8 were again sampled with
nitrogen carrier gas, which results in a vague calculated quantity of xenon. The
remaining samples show yields between 104% and 111%. The reason for this is
probably found in an imprecision in the calibration of the gas chromatograph
[Ringbom et al., 2009].
4.3 Results and discussions
The results of both campaigns are given in table 4.3. Dark gray cell colors mark
concentrations below the critical limit LC . However, since the detector system
SEL01 in Kista was not calibrated for efficiency, the efficiency calibration of a
different SAUNA detector was used the samples of the first campaign are aﬄicted
with an additional 20% of systematic uncertainties [Ringbom et al., 2009]. Also,
in case of the HEU samples additional systematic uncertainties are probable due
to the small sampling volumes. Nevertheless, systematic uncertainties should
cancel out to a large degree, when isotopic ratios are calculated.
The measured 133Xe activity concentrations were found between 11 Bq/m3 to
70 Bq/m3 for normal reactor operation at full power. The samples contained
131mXe varying from 0.01 Bq/m3 to 0.8 Bq/m3 and activity concentrations be-
tween 0.06 Bq/m3 and 14 Bq/m3 for 133mXe. Despite the long transport times
from Austria to Sweden, 135Xe, which has a half-life of 9.1 h, was possible to
detect in six samples at concentrations between 29 Bq/m3 and 1.6×104 Bq/m3.
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Some samples of the second campaign are found to contain counts originating
from 125Xe, which does not belong to the CTBT-relevant nuclides. Xenon-125
has a half-life of about 16.9 h and decays to 125I via almost 100% electron capture
[ENSDF, 2009]. Gamma energies, interesting for analysis are: 243 keV (30.1%),
188 keV (54.0%) and 55 keV (6.8%). Conversion electrons are found at: 210 keV
(1.9%), 155 keV (6.3%) and 22 keV (24.8%) together with X-ray energies around
30 keV. Within the beta-gamma spectrum 125Xe is mostly visible through its
22 keV (24.8%) conversion electron detected in coincidence with a X-ray photon
(30 keV) and/or any other possible gamma photon originating from a different
125Xe-decay. A rough estimation was made analysing sample 6, which had the
largest amount of 125Xe, resulting in an activity concentration of 170 Bq/m3
[Ringbom et al., 2009]. Figure 4.3, which is based on numerical simulations,
shows an approximate 125Xe/133Xe ratio of 10:1, which fits to the measured
133Xe activity concentration of 17.6 Bq/m3 (see table 4.3). The impact of 125Xe
on the measured activity concentration of 135Xe was minimized by redefining
the 125Xe-ROI and its overall efficiency.
The isotopic ratios of all measurements, in which the four CTBT-relevant
radioxenon isotopes were detected, lie on the civil side of the discrimination line.
These are the samples 2,3,4,6 and 7 of the second campaign and the sample 9
of the first campaign. Together with a background sample (no. 9 of the second
campaign), in which, since no 135Xe was detected, the MDC was used as its
135Xe-activity concentration, their isotopic ratios can be seen in figure 4.4.
Looking at the four-nuclide plot, the reactor air samples are found in the civil
region as expected. Also, the activity ratios of the sample containing irradiated
air are in line with the simulation. The measurements of the HEU targets,
however, are shifted to the left, far from theoretical predictions. The black solid
line symbolizes the time evolution of the activity ratios for samples that suffer
full in-growth from parent nuclides, while the black dashed line shows the decay
after the radioxenon isotopes have been separated from their precursors. This
was done after ten minutes of nitrogen flushing.
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Figure 4.3: Simulations on the time evolution of some activity ratios, especially
125Xe/133Xe. The sampling was finished within ten minutes [Saey,
2010a].
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Figure 4.4: Data of the measurements and numerical calculations in a four-
radionuclide plot (above) and a three-radionuclide plot (below). The
red dashed line is the discrimination line dividing the plots into a nu-
clear power plant region (left) and a explosion scenario region (right)
[Saey, 2010a].
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In the three-nuclide plot, which disregards the 131mXe activity concentrations,
the HEU samples fit much better to the simulations. The reason for this, how-
ever, is not fully understood for the time being. The data of the remaining
samples, although they are all found on the right-hand side of the discrimina-
tion line, do not stand in contrast to the four-nuclide plot (see [Kalinowski et al.,
2010] for more information).
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5 Conclusions and outlook
Prior to the experiments it was unclear which activity concentrations of ra-
dioxenon releases were to expect from a typical research reactor. Estimations
have been made that resulted in activity concentrations ranging from 0.7 GBq/m3
in the event of a total cladding failure of one fuel element to concentrations too
low for measurement (< 1 mBq/m3). The experiments explicitly show the pres-
ence of all four CTBT-relevant radioxenon isotopes plus 125Xe, especially in the
sample containing activated air from the irradiation tubes.
The samples containing all four CTBT-relevant radioxenon isotopes are found
to be in the civil area following the screening criteria proposed in [Kalinowski
et al., 2010]. This also holds for the two samples that were taken from irradiated
HEU targets.
With exception of 125Xe, which is being produced by neutron capture of en-
vironmental 124Xe, the origin of the radioxenon isotopes could not be clarified.
Accounting for a 10% overall xenon transport efficiency, estimations regarding
a complete fuel element failure would still result in activity concentrations at
least six orders of magnitude stronger. The radioxenon could, however, stem
from a pin hole or a hairline crack which releases only a minor percentage of the
gaseous fission product inventory. Matters are similar focusing on the uranium
contamination of the outside of the fuel element claddings, where estimations
yield activity concentrations of about the same order of magnitude. In this case
it seems reasonable, that the initial amount of 235U has drastically decreased
over time due to dissolving into the reactor water, which is continuously cleaned
by an ion exchanger.
However, the explicit identification of the true origin(s) of the measured ra-
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dioxenon isotopes remains unclear and evidences the necessity of further studies.
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6 Epilogue
On February 9, literally at the final stage of this work, during a routine inspec-
tion of the fuel elements (fuel element length measurements) and the SAUNA
sampler being dismantled already, one fuel element was found to be stuck in its
core position. From the area around this fuel element the release of gas bubbles
was observed, some of which were caught by hand in a glass flask and analyzed
by a conventional gamma detector. All four CTBT-relevant radioxenon isotopes
were detected in the sample in the maximum range of kBq (133Xe), however,
exact activity concentrations remain to be studied. It is most likely that this
fuel element had a damaged cladding, and therefore is to be seen as the reason
for the radioxenon emissions observed in this study. Further investigations are
in progress.
In any case, the results presented in this work, especially the total numbers
on the radioxenon amounts, have to be viewed under this aspect.
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